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OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD
Washington 25, D. C.

March 18, 1954

MEMORANDUM TO THE BOARD ASSISTANTS

SUBJECT: Post-Berlin Conference Guidance Paper

Attached is a guidance paper on follow-up exploitation of the Berlin Four-Power Conference, developed and agreed to by the OCB Working Group on the Berlin-Four-Power Conference. This paper completes the working group's action under its terms of reference.

Since no questions of substance have arisen on this paper at the working group level, I suggest that further substantive review is unnecessary and that the paper should be forwarded promptly to the Board with the recommendation that it be distributed as official guidance to the member agencies and USIA on this subject.

Elmer B. Staats
Elmer B. Staats
Executive Officer

Attachment:

Exploitation of Berlin Conference

OCB File No. 39

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EXPLOITATION OF BERLIN CONFERENCE

I. PROBLEM

To develop guide lines for propaganda exploitation of the results of the Berlin Conference in furtherance of US national policies.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Berlin Conference Results.

1. From a psychological point of view, the results of the Berlin Conference face us with a double problem during the period between now and the opening of the Conference on the Korean and Indochina issues at Geneva on April 26th. One side of the problem is to derive maximum psychological advantage for the furtherance of US policies in Europe from the Berlin demonstration of Soviet policies and intentions on European issues. The other aspect of the problem is to create a climate of world opinion in anticipation of the Korean Political Conference favorable for the achievement of US foreign policy objectives, both in the Far East and in Europe. (This aspect of the problem will be handled in a separate paper.)

2. There is a general consensus among Western participants in, and observers of, the Berlin Conference, that the discussions among the four Foreign Ministers on European issues resulted in clear exposure of five cardinal aspects of Soviet policy and intentions toward Europe. These were:

- (a) To prevent altogether, or at least to delay as long as possible, the re-arming of Western Germany within EDC.
- (b) To maintain and consolidate present Soviet politico-military control over the territories of the Eastern European satellites and the Soviet zone of Germany.
- (c) To exploit every possible divisive tendency, political, economic, or ideological, among the Western powers.
- (d) To promote sentiment in Europe favoring the exclusion of U.S. political and military influence in Europe.
- (e) To increase Soviet political influence and create opportunities for further Soviet expansion by the creation of a "Pan-European" security system in which the Soviet Union would be a dominating power.

With the possible exception of (a) above, Mr. Molotov failed notably at Berlin to shake the unity of the three Western powers in any way that would promote Soviet policy in Europe as outlined above. Mr. Molotov's tricky maneuvering gained the Russians no clear diplomatic success at Berlin and the net result must be accounted a victory for Western diplomacy.

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Over and above Molotov's diplomatic failure on European questions the results of the Berlin Conference, insofar as Europe is concerned, represent a major gain for the West in the psychological field. The naked exposure of Soviet policies and intentions in Europe forced on Mr. Molotov by the adroit probings of the three Western Ministers have, according to the best available intelligence, made a profound impression on the European public and indeed, on public opinion generally throughout the world. Mr. Molotov has made our task of exploiting the results of the Berlin Conference psychologically a reasonably easy one, at least as far as European public is concerned. Our task is to reinforce and deepen the impression already created by Mr. Molotov himself; to sharpen and clarify in European minds the undiminished threat to freedom in Europe implicit in the Soviet policies and intentions Molotov exposed.

(It is noteworthy, in this respect, that though between November 3 and November 26 last, under the pressure of the adverse world public reaction to the Soviet note of November 3, the Kremlin was forced to reverse itself and accept the Western invitation to the Berlin Conference, everything that Mr. Molotov said or did at Berlin confirmed in every respect the Soviet policies and intentions as revealed in the November 3rd note. Everything said or done at Berlin confirms the previous estimate of the Western powers that the November 3rd note is to be regarded as a basic statement of Soviet policy.)

On the one possible exception to the failure of Soviet diplomacy at Berlin, namely the effort to prevent or delay ratification of the EDC, the matter is still in doubt. Opinions are divided on whether the results of the Berlin Conference will promote or delay speedy ratification by the French and others of the EDC treaty. This doubt is perhaps not so much due to any diplomatic maneuvering by Mr. Molotov at Berlin as to the inherent political difficulties in France and the involvement in French minds between the ratification of EDC and the war in Indochina.

III. PSYCHOLOGICAL OBJECTIVES

Our psychological objectives in exploiting the results of the Berlin Conference are as follows:

A. To utilize the exposure of Soviet policies and intentions at Berlin to further US policies of closer European integration, strengthening of the European and North Atlantic systems of collective security, accelerating the realization of the European Defense Treaty, and the restoration to West Germany of the fuller measure of sovereignty accorded by the Contractual agreements.

B. To diminish the disappointment among Germans and Austrians over the failure at Berlin to achieve any substantial progress towards the unification of Germany and the liberation of Austria; to sustain a faith and confidence among both East and West Germans and Austrians that the continuation of Western policies of strengthening European integration and solidarity will eventually result in the achievement of those goals.

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C. ~~To combat apathy and hopelessness among the populations of the Soviet zone of Germany and the European Soviet satellites in the apparent prospect of protracted continuance of Soviet control and domination.~~

IV. PSYCHOLOGICAL TASKS

A. To accomplish Objective A above:

1. To make full use of all the material afforded by the Berlin Conference, and its diplomatic background, to drive home the following conclusions as to Soviet policies and intentions in Europe demonstrated at Berlin:

(a) That the Soviet Government has no interest in relaxing international tensions in Europe;

(b) That the Soviet Government has no intention of relaxing ~~one iota~~ of its iron military and police control over a single individual or an inch of territory now under its domination;

(c) That the Soviet Government has every intention of expanding its power and influence in Europe by every means short of general war;

(d) That the Soviet Government intends to continue its efforts to split the major Western powers and to weaken the solidarity of free Europe;

(e) That the Soviet Government has no intention of modifying any of its long-standing policies in Europe in any direction that would permit hope of settlement of European problems through Soviet concession.

2. To utilize all the materials afforded by the Berlin Conference and all other available historical material and argumentation to drive home the conclusions that:

(a) The unity and solidarity of the Western Powers in the face of Soviet intransigence, so conclusively demonstrated by the actions of the three Western Foreign Ministers at Berlin, stands at a peak never before attained in post-war history;

(b) This unity and solidarity, backed by a confidence in the growing collective strength of the free world, is the best possible defense against further Soviet expansionist ambitions; the best possible guarantee against renewed Soviet military aggression; the best hope of eventually shaking Soviet control and domination over its subject peoples in East Germany and Eastern Europe;

(c) Since strength is the only thing the Soviet regime respects, the accretion and acceleration of the collective strength of the

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Western powers and of free Europe is the only real hope of breaking the European deadlock so clearly revealed at Berlin;

(d) An essential ingredient in the accretion of strength, not only from the military but from the political and diplomatic point of view vis-a-vis Soviet-Communist policy in the Far East as well as in Europe is the rapid completion of the ratification of the EDC Treaty;

(e) Another essential ingredient is the restoration of a fuller measure of sovereignty to West Germany by the bringing into force of the Contractual Agreements (at present dependent upon prior ratification of the EDC Treaty).

B. To accomplish Objective B above.

1. To utilize all the materials afforded by the Berlin Conference and other available argumentation, to accomplish the following psychological tasks:

(a) To place the blame for the frustration of German hopes for unification and Austrian hopes for liberation squarely upon Molotov and the Soviet policy of obstructing progress toward freedom;

(b) To maintain German confidence in the essential rightness and practicability of the Western proposals for German unification as outlined in the "Eden Plan";

(c) To sustain among the Germans the belief that the best way of altering the power balance in Europe in favor of the West so as eventually to force the Soviet Union to accept German unity on reasonable terms continues to be for the Germans to cooperate wholeheartedly in strengthening the West by maintaining their determination to promote closer European integration and to participate in EDC;

(d) To maintain hope among Austrians that increasing strength of the West will lead to an eventual change in the balance of power in Europe which will work in favor of the restoration of Austrian independence;

(e) To demonstrate that any tendencies toward "neutralism" either in Germany or Austria will be exploited by the Soviets to the eventual detriment of both German and Austrian sovereignty;

(f) To demonstrate that the continued insistence on maintaining their occupation forces in the Soviet zones of Germany and Austria is a sign of weakness rather than strength, and that it is the Soviet "fear of freedom" that keeps them there.

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C. To accomplish Objective C above.

1. To utilize all the material afforded by the Berlin Conference and, wherever possible, to develop new material, which will implement the following themes:

(a) That the "fear of freedom" displayed by the Soviets at Berlin is a sign of weakness rather than strength;

(b) That the unity and solidarity of the Western Powers demonstrated at Berlin, which derives from increased Western confidence in Western strength gives sure ground for continued hope that some day the tide will be turned against the Soviets;

(c) That while the time is by no means ripe for any attempt to displace Soviet control by force, the continued passive resistance of the populations of the Soviet-dominated areas of Eastern Europe must in the long run have a weakening effect upon Soviet control;

(d) That passive resistance should be focused against the two main instruments of Soviet control, the Red occupation troops and the secret police apparatus;

(e) That the most effective way of weakening Soviet control and creating difficulties for the Soviet-controlled satellite governments is through popular pressures for improved living and working conditions, higher wages, better food, more consumer goods, and relaxation of work norms.

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OCB				DATE 18 March 1954		
TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	TELEPHONE	COMMENTS
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